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COMMENTARY
Is the U.S. Public Health System Ready for Bioterrorism?
An Assessment of the U.S. Public Health Infrastructure
and its Capacity for Infectious Disease Surveillance
RaymondJ. Baxter, Ph.D.,* Caroline R. Steinberg, M.B.A.,t and
Jennifer R. Shapiro, M.P.H.g
Bioterrorism has become a household word. For years experts have
warned of the potential of bioterrorist events, and today we have finally
experienced the reality of this particular horror. As the nation garners
resources to combat current and future bioterrorist activity, questions and
debate arise as to the appropriate allocation of resources. Most funding
appears targeted toward vaccines and medical supplies with little focus on
the underlying public health infrastructure. However, it is the
infrastructure-the organizations and people who comprise the nation's
public health system-that will ultimately determine the success of any
efforts to fight the spread of infectious diseases, including those resulting
from bioterrorism. Within the overarching infrastructure, it is the nation's
capacity to conduct infectious disease surveillance-detecting unusual
disease patterns, investigating sources of outbreaks, and triggering control
efforts-that will play the greatest role in our success or failure in
combating infectious diseases.
In light of ongoing concerns about the nation's public health
infrastructure and infectious disease surveillance capacity, we undertook a
study to identify gaps in the system and specific areas in need of
improvement. We performed this study on behalf of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation in the Department of Health and Human
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Services. Given recent events, we believe it is important not only to present
the gaps in the system as identified by our study, but also to provide
readers with a context and framework for discussing surveillance activities.
This Commentary presents a discussion of the goals of infectious disease
surveillance, a framework for understanding and discussing the U.S. public
health infrastructure in which surveillance occurs, and the results of our
analysis on gaps in the infectious disease surveillance system.
I. BACKGROUND
Infectious diseases are the leading cause of death worldwide, and the
third leading cause of death in the United States. In the twentieth century
therapeutic advances, such as the introduction of antibiotics and the
development of vaccines, have decreased the risks posed by infectious
diseases. Dramatic medical successes led some experts in the 1960s and
1970s to proclaim that infections had been conquered in this country and
were no longer a significant hazard. However, in the last twenty years,
infectious diseases have once again become a threat.
A. Increasing Threat of Infectious Diseases
As we move into the twenty-first century, biological, sociological,
technological, and political factors have converged to promote the
emergence of new infections, and renew anxiety about the possibility of
bioterrorism and the resurgence of some conditions that were thought to
have been conquered only a few decades ago.
Globalization of the world economy has increased the reach of
pathogens. Rapid air travel allows a person who has early, minor, or
misleading symptoms of a dangerous, highly contagious infection to
expose hundreds of others in planes, in airports, and in hotels around the
world. International businesses and rapid transportation create the
possibility that food can be contaminated in one country, further
contaminate large quantities of food in bulk processing plants in another
country, and be shipped to yet additional countries where illness results.
Bioterrorism is also an increasing concern. Large quantities of highly
communicable microorganisms can be grown inexpensively, transported
inconspicuously, and released anonymously by terrorists to produce
widespread panic, illness, and death.
Other infectious disease challenges are more subtle but represent an
equal if not greater threat to the health of the public. Decades of use and
misuse of antimicrobial agents are inducing antibiotic resistance in
organisms once readily treated. Most physicians have limited clinical
11:1 (2001)
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experience with many significant infectious disease threats, and a large
portion of the public have been protected from epidemic and endemic
infections that were part of the day-to-day reality for their parents and
grandparents. As a result, the public's responses to infectious disease
threats are muted.
B. Role of Surveillance in Detecting Infectious Diseases
Surveillance is widely regarded as the key to detecting new and
emerging diseases, as well as tracking incidence and prevalence of
established diseases. Surveillance data help detect unusual disease patterns
and trigger control efforts. In 1963, Alexander Langmuir, organizer of the
Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) at the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), coined the modern definition of public health surveillance, which
was later endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO). Langmuir
defined public health surveillance as having three elements: (1) the
systematic collection of pertinent data; (2) the orderly consolidation and
evaluation of the data; and (3) the prompt dissemination of results to those
who need to know (e.g., relevant health authorities).
The data referred to in the above definition include information such
as the diagnosis of the disease, disease severity, geographic distribution of
cases, and the route of transmission. The unit of analysis in surveillance is a
case, which is an instance of a single individual with the disease.
The definition implies an ordered sequence of discrete activities or
events that can be used both for circumscribing the surveillance process
and for assessing what needs to be improved. Essential steps in the
surveillance process include: (1) diagnosis of a health event by clinicians
and laboratories; (2) reporting of health events and other disease
information to local, state, and/or federal health agencies (reporting
sources include clinicians, laboratories, hospitals, schools, and vital
statistics records); and (3) management of health event data. Once
information is reported, the data are collected, entered into a data
management system, and edited. The information is then analyzed to
establish baseline disease information and time trends. The data are
examined for the identification and documentation of outbreaks. Reports
are then generated and disseminated so that appropriate public health
actions can be taken.
Surveillance activities can recognize the occurrence of new or
emerging infections and track the prevalence of infectious agents already
established in human populations. Effective surveillance programs are able
to detect unusual clusters of disease, document the geographic and
demographic spread of an outbreak, and estimate the magnitude of an
3
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infectious disease problem. In addition, effective surveillance helps identify
the natural history of a disease and factors responsible for its emergence,
facilitates laboratory and epidemiological research, and assesses the success
of specific intervention efforts.
Poor surveillance leads to incomplete, non-representative, and
untimely disease reporting. These gaps leave policy makers and medical
personnel without a basis for setting policy to control the spread of
infectious diseases and to mount an effective prevention and treatment
campaign. For example, in the 1980s tuberculosis was no longer
considered a significant problem, and surveillance of the disease declined.
The reemergence of the disease in the early 1990s, particularly multi-drug-
resistant strains, took the public health and medical communities by
surprise.
C. Surveillance Challenges
Changes in the systems to provide and pay for health care pose both
an opportunity and a threat to surveillance of infectious diseases. Concerns
over double-digit health care inflation in the 1980s made cost control a
number one priority for both policy makers and the major payers for
health care delivery, private employers. During the past two decades the
U.S. population has rapidly moved into managed care. The promised focus
of managed care-managing the health of a population-should bring the
goals of the delivery system closer to those of public health. There is great
potential for productive collaboration in prevention of illness and in using
managed care databases to integrate patient data across the continuum of
care.
On the other hand, concerns about costs have changed clinical and
laboratory practices in ways that limit the availability and reduce the utility
of information upon which infectious disease surveillance has traditionally
been based. Intense competition and razor-thin profit margins among
laboratories have driven the adoption of highly efficient processes that
narrow the range of tests conducted on specimens. New technologies allow
private labs to identify the nature of an individual patient's illness faster
and cheaper so that growth and identification of the specific pathogen are
sometimes not needed to recommend appropriate treatment. While this
represents an advantage to efficiency and effectiveness of care for the
individual patient, it obviates the clinical need for tests of public health
significance.
Current capacity for infectious disease surveillance is a product of a
century of piecemeal investments as the country has organized to respond
to various biological threats. Much of the investment has been categorical,
11: 1 (200 1)
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resulting in uneven capacity depending on disease type and fragmentation
of surveillance efforts across the spectrum of infectious disease threats. The
CDC alone has literally hundreds of data collection systems and data sets.
Legal authority for surveillance rests with the states and localities,
adding another dimension to the fragmentation noted above-not only is
surveillance fragmented by disease type, it is also fragmented
geographically. The presence of hundreds of jurisdictions makes it difficult
and confusing for those required to report infectious diseases and can
make it hard to identify and respond to threats that cross county and state
boundaries. The lack of standards for data collection, storage, and
transmission makes it hard for states and localities to work collaboratively
to develop more effective interfaces with the private sector.
Differing authority and oversight also mean different levels of
resources devoted to surveillance at both the state and local level. There is
currently a lack of consensus or guidelines for what should be monitored,
by whom, and in which populations. As such, capabilities vary substantially
both within and across states. Despite expanding expectations for the
scope and nature of surveillance efforts, resources devoted to surveillance
have changed little at the local level, and in many places have actually
declined.
Thus, as the threats of infectious diseases increase, it becomes crucial
to re-examine the public health system in this country. Preparing a defense
against bioterrorism, as well as naturally occurring infections, will require
targeted interventions to ensure the presence of a strong and reliable
public health infrastructure and surveillance system.
II. METHODOLOGY
This study was based on an analysis of recent literature,' interviews with
fifty-five surveillance experts in the field, and validation through direct
observation of the capacity currently in place for surveillance in Baltimore,
Oregon, and West Virginia.2 Additionally, we received input from a blue
ribbon panel drawn from state and local health departments, academe,
private provider systems, laboratories, and the CDC. This study was
conducted in 1999 and 2000, but given the tenacity and systemic nature of
the issues identified by our study, we consider our results to remain highly
relevant today.
We thoroughly reviewed the literature pertaining to infectious disease
surveillance. This enabled us to synthesize current thinking on the topic
and to pinpoint specific issues or gaps within the public health
infrastructure and surveillance activities for which there is widespread
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concern among published authors and researchers. The key issues
identified through the literature review formed the basis of our subsequent
interviews with surveillance experts.
After completing the literature review, we conducted detailed
conversations with fifty-five surveillance experts around the country and in
Canada. These surveillance experts represented local and state
governments, the CDC, academic institutions, laboratories, private
providers, managed care organizations, the military, and the Veterans
Administration.
Using the literature review results as a starting point, we developed a
conversation guide to structure our discussions.3 As part of the interviews,
we provided each surveillance expert with one of seven surveillance
scenarios (Appendix) and asked each person to describe: How the
infectious disease surveillance process should work in dealing with this
scenario? Where would it be likely to breakdown? Where would you invest
resources to improve capabilities to handle this scenario? And what would
you hope to achieve from this investment?
We also asked the surveillance experts to provide their definition of
surveillance; describe surveillance successes and failures in which they were
personally involved to illustrate the current strengths and weaknesses of
surveillance capacity; discuss the strengths and limitations of surveillance
with regard to selected issues including education and training, staffing,
technology, information flow, legal authority, the impact of managed care,
and other topics; and identify the types of situations that represent the
greatest threat to the population's health.
The blue ribbon panel also met twice to provide input and guidance in
this study. These meetings aimed to identify and prioritize opportunities to
improve domestic surveillance of infectious diseases. In addition, for each
opportunity area, the panel sought to identify minimal performance goals
and objectives; to identify what core capacity needs to exist to meet these
objectives; and to specify the interventions/investments that would be
required to attain the core capacities and performance goals.
We also conducted a "goals and performance" exercise with the expert
panelists. The exercise asked each panelist to rank the importance of eight
goals of surveillance at each level of government on a five-point scale. 4 It
then asked each panelist to rank system performance relative to each goal
at each level of government. The resulting data was displayed in a matrix
format to visually depict gaps in the system.
Following the first blue ribbon panel meeting, we conducted site visits
to test these identified gaps against the priorities of surveillance systems
that have taken, or are currently undertaking, efforts to improve their
11:l1(2001)
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surveillance capabilities. The site visits were conducted in January and
February 2000.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Goals of Infectious Disease Surveillance
Based on a review of relevant literature and the advice of the expert
panel, we identified eight goals for infectious disease surveillance. These
include:
1. Detecting Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases. Infectious disease surveillance
allows public health officials to differentiate between endemic and
epidemic levels of disease by placing current incidence statistics in the
perspective of normal levels. An epidemic, or outbreak, of a disease is its
occurrence at an unexpectedly high frequency. Determination of whether
the level of disease is higher than normal is only possible when the "usual"
or baseline rate of the disease is known. Surveillance systems regularly
monitor the health status of populations and therefore allow the
identification of baseline levels of different diseases. For instance,
surveillance efforts have shown that the endemic level of measles in the
United States is extremely low. Nearly all new outbreaks can be attributed
to imported measles cases. This type of information helps policy makers
focus disease control efforts.
2. Detecting Changes in the Epidemiology of Infection. Patterns of infection
change over time. For instance, a disease that at one time primarily
affected young children may now have its greatest effect on young adults or
the elderly. Many factors can, account for changes in the epidemiology of
infection, such as implementation of a vaccination campaign or mutations
in the infectious agent. For example, after vaccination for measles became
routine in the United States, the average age at which individuals became
infected rose significantly, changing the health care needs of the affected
population. Surveillance identifies these important trends.
3. Providing Information to Prompt and Guide a Public Health Response at
both the Individual and Population Level. Without a firm understanding of
who, where, and why people become infected and by what, the public
health community would have no reasonable approach for tackling a
problem caused by an infectious agent. Surveillance was instituted to
enable society to deal with immediaje communicable disease threats.
Surveillance information is critical for making intelligent decisions to
protect the health of the public both at the population and the individual
level. Botulism and meningitis surveillance both illustrate the multiple
roles of surveillance information. The purposes of reporting suspected
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botulism are: (1) to aid clinicians in making the diagnosis of this rare
disease; (2) to provide access to treatment, often available only through
the public health service with the approval of state health officials; and (3)
to identify the source of disease through a public health investigation. The
source could be either a home-canned product, which generates one kind
of public health response, or a commercial product, which generates a very
different response. In the case of meningitis surveillance, the primary goal
at the local level is to identify close family and child daycare contacts for
prophylactic administration of rifampin within forty-eight hours to prevent
other cases of disease.
4. Assessing the Health Status of the Public. A primary role of disease
surveillance is the assessment of the overall health status of the public.
Infectious disease surveillance provides descriptive information on the
most frequent causes of morbidity and mortality in communities, the
magnitude of health problems, and the demographic and geographic
distribution of diseases.
5. Evaluating Prevention and Control Interventions. Prevention guidelines,
screening, vaccination, efforts to change lifestyles, and other disease
prevention and control interventions are designed to improve health
outcomes. Surveillance systems enable the evaluation of these efforts by
charting changes in health status before and after introduction of the
intervention. For example, active surveillance of Group B Streptococcus,
funded through the Emerging Infections Program, has monitored the
burden of disease over time and has been crucial in measuring the uptake
and impact of prevention measures. Likewise, the incidence of diseases for
which vaccines are available can be used to assess the success of efforts to
increase vaccination rates. Using surveillance data to evaluate prevention
programs can improve program designs and better target public awareness
campaigns.
6. Aiding in Understanding the Etiology and Natural History of Diseases.
Disease surveillance data can be used to help understand the etiology
(factors of causation) and natural history of diseases. Surveillance can
provide information that helps determine the mode of disease
transmission (e.g., vector-borne or water-borne); short- and long-term
trends of disease (including the incidence, prevalence, and case fatality
over time); risk factors for new and old diseases (e.g., age, gender, or co-
morbidities); and environmental factors related to diseases (e.g., warm
climates or seasonal changes). However, undertaking surveillance
exclusively for research purposes is uncommon since specific aspects of a
disease are better investigated by more detailed data collection and
tracking of cases (e.g., registries).
11:1 (2001)
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7. Assisting in Health Planning. Information obtained from surveillance
systems can be used to guide health planning. For example, health
departments can use surveillance information to help prioritize efforts to
combat the most prevalent preventable diseases, set target goals (e.g.,
Healthy People 2010), and estimate resource needs.
8. Identifying Research Needs. Disease surveillance can be used to identify
gaps or unexplored areas of research. For example, surveillance data may
reveal the emergence of a new antibiotic resistant strain of bacteria (e.g.,
penicillin-resistant strains of gonorrhea that required the development of
new drugs for treatment). Additionally, surveillance may reveal that a
certain disease has emerged in a previously unaffected population, thereby
indicating the need for studies on possible reasons for this shift (e.g.,
socioeconomic changes or the influx of people from other communities).
B. Examining Surveillance Goals at Local, State, and CDC Levels
Meeting these goals requires collecting data, translating that data into
information to support decision-making, and communicating that
information to those who need to take action or be informed.
Performance relative to these goals varies widely across jurisdictions. While
all of these surveillance goals are important, the prioritization of these
goals differs among various surveillance entities. In assessing areas in the
public health infrastructure and surveillance system for improvement, it is
critical to ensure that investments target high priority goals for which the
current level of performance is inadequate.
Based on the assessment of the expert panelists, a number of goals fall
into a "low performance/high priority" category. At the local level there
are five such target goals including: detecting outbreaks, detecting changes
in the epidemiology of infection, assessing the health status of the public,
evaluating prevention and control interventions, and assisting in health
planning (figure 1).
At the state level, the four goals that fall into the "low
performance/high priority" category include: detecting changes in the
epidemiology of infection, assessing the health status of the public,
evaluating prevention and control interventions, and assisting in health
planning (figure 2).
Finally, at the CDC level, only two goals fall into the "low
performance/high priority" category: evaluating prevention and control
interventions and assisting in health planning (figure 3).
In comparing the categorization of goals across the three levels of
surveillance, the local level has the greatest number of target goals,
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Figure 1. Goals of Surveillance-Performance and Priorities at the Local Level
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Figure 2. Goals of Surveillance-Performance and Priorities at the State Level
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followed by the state level, with the CDC level having the best perceived
performance overall. Thus, not only should an effective plan to improve
the core capacity for infectious disease surveillance target specific
surveillance goals that fall into the "low performance/high priority"
category, but it should also focus resources on improving performance at
the local level, either through direct investment in local capacity, or
through federal and state support and the development of new data flow
arrangements.
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Figure 3. Goals of Surveillance-Performance and Priorities at the CDC Level
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C. Framework for Assessing the Public Health Infrastructure and Infectious Disease
Surveillance System
In accomplishing the goals described above, the core system for
surveillance in this country involves a cascade of activities, with each step
triggering a response from the next level of the system. As depicted in
Figure 4, effective surveillance within the current hierarchical system
requires a complex set of interactions and information flows among the
clinical delivery system, public and private laboratories, and public health
personnel at each level of government.
Laboratories and providers identify and report cases of infectious
disease to the appropriate public health authorities. These data are used to
guide an immediate public health response to individual reported cases of
disease to (1) ensure correct diagnosis and treatment;
(2) gather more detailed surveillance information such as risk factors; (3)
identify, screen, and/or treat contacts who may also be at risk; and (4)
determine the appropriate public health response (e.g., pulling
contaminated food off the shelves). Moreover, public health officials
translate these data into information to guide decision-making with respect
to their broader role in protecting the public against infectious disease
threats. These officials then provide data up the chain-local health
officials provide data to state health officials who in turn provide data to
the CDC. Each subsequent level of government conducts further analyses
to understand the nature of biological threats and to develop strategies to
address them. The information produced at each level in the system then
11
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ideally flows back down the chain to each of the entities involved in
surveillance.
This core system is supported by educational institutions that train
clinical and public health professionals, accrediting and licensing bodies
that set standards, a public and private research establishment that
provides supporting technologies, and policy makers who provide the
funding and legal framework for surveillance of infectious diseases.
Figure 4. Interactions and Information Flows for Infectious Disease Surveillance
Other Professional Providers Laboratories tr e lTraining Venys fru Research
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D. Citical Gaps in U.S. Infectious Diseas  Surveillance Capacity
Our analyses assessed ways to improve this intricately linked
hierarchical system for surveillance of infectious diseases as well as ways to
reorganiz te a system to take advantage of advances in communications
technology, and to respond to infectious disease threats that increasingly
cross county and state boundaries. Military surveillance systems and the
United States' participation in global surveillance activities were beyond
the scope of this project.
Below we identify a series of critical gaps that need to be addressed to
ensure the population is adequately protected against infectious disease
threats. We identified these gaps through the literature review and blue
ribbon panel, and then validated them on the site visits.
1. Gaps in the Core Capacity of the Key Entities Involved in Conducting
Surveillance of Infectious Diseases. This type of gap refers to the resources
within state and local health departments, the CDC, public and private
11:l1 (200 1)
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laboratories, and provider systems that allow each entity to perform its role
in meeting the goals of surveillance. Our study identified the following
specific gaps:
a. No clear standards exist that define the critical surveillance needs and
associated capacity requirements at all levels of the system. While some efforts
have been made to define standards for public health laboratories and
food-borne diseases, no comprehensive and systematic effort has been
undertaken.
b. Local capacity is not sufficient to ensure adequate performance across the
eight goals of surveillance. Staffing, skill levels, technological capability, and
training are uneven across the country, leaving some populations not as
well protected from infectious disease threats as others. Local-level public
health officials need support from state health departments and the CDC
to develop needed skills, to back up local-level staff during outbreaks, and
to provide technological support and guidelines for how to handle various
situations. For example, after the report of a case, public health staff often
have to contact the provider and/or the affected individual to obtain
complete information about the clinical picture, demographics and risks,
treatment options, and contacts who may be at risk and who may require
testing or prophylactic treatment.
At one of the sites visited, a school bus driver was diagnosed with
tuberculosis, requiring public health officials to identify and test more
than one hundred children who may have been exposed. This investigative
activity is a key, very labor intensive part of the surveillance process that
often falls through the cracks because of a lack of local capacity. Without it,
public health response to individual cases is difficult, and most case reports
will be missing key information that make the data less useful for analysis at
higher levels in the system.
c. Staff capacity at the state and large local level (cities and metropolitan
areas) is frequently not adequate to support ongoing collection and analysis of
surveillance data to detect changes in the epidemiology of infection, to evaluate
surveillance efforts, to plan interventions, and to set priorities. For example, lack
of staff capacity to conduct mosquito surveillance in New York City
contributed to the delayed recognition of the West Nile Virus. Site visits
confirmed reports that capacity varies widely both across states and
localities, as well as across programs within a public health agency.
d. Computerized decision and analytic support tools have not been
developed to their fullest potential to support infectious disease surveillance activities.
For example, the military currently has the capability to collect patient data
electronically on a real-time basis from field personnel. This data is fed
into computer software that can detect when the occurrence of disease is
13
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outside its expected frequency. While this system is not currently
applicable to public health on a broad scale, it illustrates the potential
utility of electronic medical record data for surveillance within defined
populations.
e. The public and private laboratory capacity supporting surveillance has
eroded. Public health laboratories are perceived to be behind the private
sector in terms of technology development, dissemination, and adoption.
Meanwhile, private laboratories, which focus on clinical rather than
broader public health needs, face cost pressures that have encouraged
fewer and less specific tests. Private laboratory consolidation into large
regional or national facilities has made the current practice of reporting
separately to each jurisdiction cumbersome and impractical.
2. Gaps in the Flow of Data and Information Among the Entities Involved in
Surveillance of Infectious Diseases. As outlined above, surveillance of
infectious diseases involves a series of data and information flows among
the numerous entities involved in surveillance. Our analysis identified a
number of critical gaps in these flows (figure 5):
a. Provider and laboratory reporting of infectious diseases is incomplete
and not timely. Case reporting is a critical foundation for infectious disease
surveillance; full participation from the provider community is a necessary
component of a functional surveillance system under current data flow
arrangements. Estimates of completeness of reporting range from 6% to
90% for many of the common notifiable diseases. Reasons given by
providers for not reporting include: assumed that the case would be
Figure 5. Gaps in Flows Among Entities
Providers 1, Lab oratories
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reported by someone else; unaware that disease reporting was required; do
not have notifiable disease reporting form or telephone number; do not
know how to report notifiable diseases; do not have the list of notifiable
diseases; concerned about confidentiality; concerned about violation of
doctor-patient relationship; reporting is too time-consuming; and absence
of incentives to report.
b. A great deal of data flows through the system, but feedback and analyses
need to be more effectively packaged and disseminated from the CDC to states and
locals, from states to locals, and from public health venues to the clinical delivery
system. Better feedback would help to engage the delivery system in
infectious disease surveillance.
3. Gaps in the Structures that Support Surveillance. As described above, the
core system is supported by educational institutions, accrediting and
licensing agencies, the public and private research establishment, and
policy makers. Figure 6 depicts gaps pertaining to these structures. Gaps
identified with respect to these supporting structures include:
a. Public health workers specifically trained to do infectious disease
surveillance are perceived to be in short supply.
b. Training programs do not adequately educate clinical health
professionals on their role in surveillance.
c. Research and development of new laboratory technology is focused on
clinical rather than public health applications. Advanced laboratory technology
that is available to support surveillance needs to be disseminated and
adopted more rapidly.
Figure 6. Gaps in Structures that Support Surveillance
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d. Public health misses opportunities to communicate the importance of
surveillance to policy makers and the media. A better understanding of
surveillance among these constituencies would help ensure adequate
funding and a rational legal framework to support it.
E. Other Issues for Consideration
In addition to these specific gaps in the system, we identified a number
of cross-cutting issues that need to be addressed. These include:
1. Information Technology. Information technology offers opportunity
for improvement across many areas, but significant obstacles exist to its
widespread deployment. Support is lacking for existing technologies and
current capabilities are uneven across states, localities, and disease areas.
Lack of data standards and issues of privacy, confidentiality, and security
must be resolved before systemic solutions can be implemented.
2. Widespread Innovation but Limited Sharing. States, localities, and
disease areas within the CDC are developing multiple solutions to the same
problems around data capture, analysis, and transmission. For example,
many states are developing their own systems to integrate data across
disease areas. There is a missed opportunity to share information and
capture and disseminate lessons learned.
3. Categorical Funding. The historic patterns of categorical funding have
impeded the development of a basic surveillance infrastructure capable of
meeting the most critical disease threats. The surveillance infrastructure is
fragmented and focused on specific diseases rather than on the broad
range of threats that face a given population. This fragmentation is both a
function of how Congress has funded the CDC and how the CDC allocates
money to states and localities. As a result, data systems are incompatible
and capacity is uneven across disease areas. The flexibility of federal
funding for emerging infections and bioterrorism has been widely praised
for its contribution to core capacity, but critical gaps still remain.
CONCLUSION
Numerous gaps in U.S. capabilities for conducting infectious disease
surveillance leave the health of the public susceptible to a wide array of
threats. The current categorical system is unprepared to deal with some of
the most urgent concerns facing the public health system. Specifically, the








Well before the anthrax bioterrorist event, the concept of bioterrorism
received a great deal of attention by legislators, government officials, and
the press. It is defined as the deliberate spread of infectious diseases.
Bioterrorism events can be potentially devastating-they are
unpredictable, and their effects could easily overwhelm our medical care
system. Strong surveillance is needed to identify these events at the earliest
sign in order to trigger an immediate response. Bioterrorism falls outside
the scope of most of our current surveillance efforts in that resulting
infectious illness cannot be defined in categorical terms.
The framework and gap analysis presented in this paper can inform
policy-makers as they develop an investment plan to strengthen the public
health system to identify and respond to bioterrorist attacks. The recent
anthrax attacks serve to highlight the importance of strengthening key
components of our nation's core capacity for infectious disease
surveillance, including: staff investigative and response capacity;
communication channels between providers and public health officials to
ensure individual cases are recognized and treated; and laboratory capacity
to identify cases and areas of contamination.
B. Emerging Infections
These include new or resurgent infectious diseases. New Variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (the human disease associated with bovine
spongiform encephalopathy or "mad cow" disease) is one recent example.
These infections often take providers and public health officials by
surprise, leaving the medical and health care communities unarmed to
defend against them in the short term. Rigorous surveillance is needed to
identify and control such diseases before they become widespread.
C. Drug Resistance
Many infectious pathogens are renowned for their ability to mutate to
accommodate changes in the environment. One particularly devastating
type of mutation enables pathogens to become resistant to antibiotics-for
example, drug resistant tuberculosis has emerged as a major problem
around the world. When this situation occurs, pathogens can thrive despite
medical treatment. Surveillance is critical to identifying changes in
pathogens so that drug development can keep pace with evolving
pathogens.
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D. Pandemic Influenza
Experts fear the antigenic shift to a new pandemic strain of influenza,
such as occurred in 1957 with the introduction of the Asian strain and in
1968 with the introduction of the Hong Kong strain. In each of these
instances there was a significant increase in illness and deaths. The
essential role of surveillance is to recognize the antigenic shift as quickly as
possible so that the new strain can be incorporated into the vaccine.
While these examples represent those threats of greatest concern to
surveillance experts, a myriad of smaller-scale, every day threats also persist
that can only be addressed through strengthened surveillance capacity.
As the United States faces its first major bioterrorist attack, lawmakers
are debating how to improve the nation's capacity to protect the public
from what has long been feared, but is now a reality. While bolstering the
nation's supply of vaccines and pharmaceuticals is important, it is even
more critical to shore up the public health infrastructure-the people,
systems, and linkages that work to detect unusual patterns of disease-to
investigate sources of outbreaks and to take measures to protect the health
of the public. Substantial investment will be critical to ensure sufficient
resources are in place at the federal, state, and local levels so that we are
prepared for all types of biological threats.
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Scenario 1: The challenge is to recognize a new respiratory illness. It can have
multiple sources, including liquid aerosols. It is transmitted by the airborne route
and from person-to-person. The attack rate for exposed individuals is about 30%.
Most who have symptoms see physicians. To an experienced clinician, it does not
look like typical influenza or other common infections although less experienced
clinicians may be misled. It is very debilitating for about a week, but only a small
portion of victims require hospitalization, and even fewer die.
Scenario 2: The challenge is to recognize a major change in antimicrobial
drug resistance. The organism affected is not one commonly associated with
multiple drug resistance and is not thought of as causing major infections in
hospitalized or debilitated patients. It is a common cause of mild urinary tract
infections, especially affecting young women-so called honeymoon cystitis. It can
transmit its unique mechanism of drug resistance to a wide variety of other
organisms.
Scenario 3: The challenge is to recognize a serious infection that does not fit
the case definitions of any of the major reportable diseases and causes severe
debilitation, but not death. This infection's source can be contaminated food or
water. The incubation period is approximately 2 to 5 days, and the attack rate is
about 30%. Its symptoms include a very unusual and severe headache, severe
fatigue, and minor diarrhea. It is very debilitating-people are "wiped out" for at
least a week-but physicians typically do not admit patients to the hospital. Few die
from it, and the occasional deaths are due to a variety of complications.
Scenario 4: The challenge is to recognize importation of a highly contagious
and quite serious viral hemorrhagic fever. The source is an infected individual
who travels through several states using a series of crowded common carriers. With
this condition, spread occurs during a relatively prolonged period-4 to 7 days-
before the infected individual becomes quite ill. Attack rates are moderately high,
and deaths are very common among those infected.
Scenario 5: The challenge is to recognize an important epidemic involving a
common, community-acquired infection. Here, a processor of nationally
distributed consumer foods changes its production processes, which leads to
ongoing contamination of non-perishable foods with a Salmonella strain. The foods
are typically used in restaurants and homes. A food item may be ingested within a
week, or as long as six or more months, after production. The contaminated foods
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have neither a different taste nor appearance, but depending on the way the food
is handled at the point of use, it may cause illness in 5% to 30% of people.
Scenario 6: The challenge is to recognize an important change in the
epidemiology of an enteroviral pathogen. Imagine that a new purification system
for potable and swimming pool water becomes available that produces water with
much greater customer satisfaction at much lower cost. As a result, this system is
adopted by municipal systems and pool operators relatively quickly over a 1 to 2
year period. Even though the mechanism is unclear, some strains of enteroviruses
are not inactivated by this process, and outbreaks of aseptic meningitis and other
typical enteroviral illnesses occur sporadically across the nation.
Scenario 7: The challenge is to recognize a change in the epidemiology of
sexually transmitted diseases caused by Chlamydia that result from changes in
sexual practices. The use of a readily available commercial product is widely
touted on the Internet and elsewhere as greatly enhancing sexual enjoyment for
men and women. Since this product was not intended to be used for this purpose,
it has never undergone any relevant testing. Unknown to anyone, use of the
product greatly enhances the ease of Chlamydia transmission and also seems to
increase the seriousness of resulting infections.
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1. The literature search entailed a
review of articles published primarily
between 1990 and 1999. Key terms that
guided our search included: surveillance;
infectious disease surveillance; disease
reporting; disease detection; surveillance
and technology; epidemics; laboratory
surveillance; surveillance and geographic
information systems; and disease outbreaks.
On-line searches were conducted in three
main databases (MEDLINE, HealthSTAR,
and HSRProj) and the World Wide Web.
Relevance was assessed according to each
article's ability to inform the following
questions: (1) What is disease surveillance?
(2) What are the key characteristics of
infectious disease surveillance? and (3)
What are the key characteristics of the
current domestic surveillance system?
2. These sites were chosen in order to
capture a range of characteristics. For
example, Oregon is widely perceived as a
"best practice" site; West Virginia has
recently implemented a number of model
initiatives and is predominantly rural; and
Baltimore is a large city region and
functions independently from the state in
which it is located.
3. The conversation guide was
designed such that each surveillance expert
responded to a somewhat different set of
questions. Questions for a particular
respondent were chosen based on a
combination of the background of each
surveillance expert and randomization.
4. These eight goals were identified
based on our literature review as well as
input from the blue ribbon panel.
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